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THE 1892 BRITISH-BENIN TREATY:
Legal and Diplomatic Implications for Contemporary
By
PROF. AKIN OYEBODE
Head, Department of International Law,
Faculty of Law,
AT
THE TENTH JACOB U. EGHAREVBA (MBE) MEMORIAL LECTURE IN
NOVEMBER 2008.
ORGANIZED BY
INSTITUTE FOR
18,
Airport
Introduction
I wish to begin by saluting the initiative of all those who had thought it
fit and proper to institute this annual lecture series in memory of the
great historian, Jacob Egharevba, a man who, by dint of hard work and
tenacity of purpose, was able to leave behind a worthy heritage in relation
to the history of Benin. The man in whose honour we are gathered here today,
was able to bring his great intellect to bear on the study of
The need for interrogating the historiography of African continent
especially as it pertains to the Euro-African encounter can hardly be more
compelling. Not only should the records be set straight, we need to draw the
necessary lessons from what transpired in the past in order not only to
obviate a repeat performance but also to enable us occupy our historical
position in the scheme of things without any feeling of guilt, inadequacy or
diffidence. The time is surely ripe to confront the arrogance of all those
who wish to re-order our realities along their own images and interests or
re-write our history with a view to covering up or suppressing their sordid
past.
It should be remembered that
It is against this background that it is intended to examine the Anglo-Benin
Treaty of
The Euro-African Encounter in Historical Perspective
The entry of Britain into Benin in 1553 through Captain Wyndham, first to
trade in pepper and soon after, slaves marked the beginning of the long
British connection with what later came to be known as Nigeria.3
The concentration of the British on slaves rather than tropical produce,
like the Portuguese before them helped to consolidate the transformation of
Africa into “a warren for the hunting of black skins.”4 Having
broken the monopoly of the Portuguese, the British wasted no time in
establishing their dominance in the entire West African seaboard.
Paradoxically, it was under the guise of stamping out the unholy traffic in
human beings that the British were able to entrench their colonial hegemony
in
Furthermore, the British never owned land in the localities where they
operated but had to lease land from the local population for the erection of
their warehouses or barracoons for holding slaves prior to their
trans-shipment to the New World.6 This testified to the
acknowledgement of the sovereignty of the native rulers by the British at
the outset of their interaction with Africa. In fact, no British vessel
could enter a rover nor could any transaction commence without the offering
of presents or “dashes” to the local rulers. With time, these presents
matured into full-scale custom duties known variously as “shake hands”,
“topping”, or “comey”, levied on every ton of cargo or slave exported.7
It is instructive that not infrequently, the local chiefs resolved
commercial disputes between the British and their
suppliers as well as providing the requisite security for the various
transactions, thereby enhancing a mutually beneficial rellationship.8
In sum, the transitional period before the confrontation that led to the
colonization of
Treaties and the Colonial
The usual means of establishing colonial hegemony was by conquest. However,
in the case of
The controversy still rages among scholars as to why the British in
His opinion would seem to have been corroborated by that of a British writer
who observed that “Trade may have followed the flag or
vice-versa, but almost before
either of them arrived in the Englishmen’s knapsacks the law of
Others have laid the resort by the British to treaties with the local chiefs
to necessity arising from their inability to effect conquest in one fell
swoop and immediate establishment of full-fledged colonial rule thereafter.13
The sheer convenience of treaty-making as against military
action, in the view of Obaro Ikime, for example, explains the predilection
of the British for treaties in many parts of Nigeria.14
However, it is submitted that no single explanation can be considered
adequate or valid to unravel the motivation of the British for
treaty-making. Although the British generally held the local potentates with
whom they were negotiating in great contempt, their frenetic effort to
secure the agreement of the local potentates was largely borne of
expediency. They did not for a minute consider the African parties as equal
partners but sought their “X” marks on the documents in a bid to secure
their hold on the territories in question against any claims over the said
territories by other prospective European colonial Power(s). As Elias had
observed, “[The] local rulers were styled ‘kings’ before the execution of
the treaties, but more often regarded or treated for all practical purposes
thereafter as ‘chiefs’ only, implying that they had full sovereign powers to
sign the treaties which ipso facto
turned them into subordinates of the new sovereigns”.15
It is worthy of note that British penetration of the domains of the local
potentates was effected through anti-slave trade treaties, commercial
treaties and so-called treaties of protection, depending on the circumstance
at hand. Accordingly, the anti-slave trade treaties provided the perfect
framework for interference by the British in the internal affairs of the
African party. It should be recalled that it was not unknown for the British
Consul to meddle in local chieftaincy disputes right up to destooling
unfriendly chiefs or influencing the appointment of preferred candidates!16
Under the guise of stamping out the unholy trade “at source”, the British
were able to waive aside any claim to sovereignty and non-interference in
their internal affairs by the local chiefs. Since the international
community had acquiesced in any step taken to put an end to slave traffic,
it became quite easy for the British to invoke international anti-slavery
instruments in riding roughshod on the independence of the African
sovereigns.
On the other hand, the commercial treaties sought to extract monopoly rights
from the hapless African chiefs and deprive them of jurisdiction in
commercial disputes involving British supercargoes and African traders which
they had been exercising hitherto.17 Not only did the treaties
envisage the establishment of consular and equity courts whose buildings
enjoyed extra-territorial status, their administration was put squarely
under the superintendence of British Consuls without exequaturs, much to the
chagrin of the local chiefs and traders. In effect, the Palmerstonian policy
of ensuring that the long arm of English law protected the Englishman
wherever he went became the precursor to full-blown colonization. Treaties
that were modeled along the lines of capitulation treaties of the
With regard to the treaties of ‘protection’ forced down the throats of the
local chiefs, it needs be stated, without any fear of contradiction, that
they were a mere prelude to de facto
imposition of British rule over inhabitants of what later became known
as Nigeria. It is worthy of not that in 1888, the Alafin of Oyo had
consigned the entire Yorubaland to the “protection” of the British in
exchange for an annual ‘dash’ of 20,000 bags of cowries!19
Some other rulers settled for much
less, items such as handkerchiefs, padlocks as well as sergeant-major
uniforms featuring frequently as consideration for subjecting themselves to
British rule and dictation.20 As
Umozurike had observed, it is quite intriguing that the treaties should be
termed treaties of protection when the party against which protection was,
in fact, needed was the colonial power seeking to imposes it in the first
place!21
It would be recalled that when King Jaja of Opobo had sought clarification
on the word, “protection” contained in a treaty presented for his signature,
the reply of the British Consul was instructive:
“I write as you request with reference to the word ‘protection’ as used in
the proposed Treaty that the Queen (of England) does not want to take your
country or your markets, but at the same time is anxious that no other
nation should take them; she undertakes to extend her gracious power and
protection which will leave your
country still under your Government; she has no wish to disturb your rule…”22
However, as Ikime has asked,
“…[H]ow could Jaja continue to rule his people as of old if, as laid down in
Article V of the treaty, he was bound to act on the advice of British
Consular officials in matters relating to the administration of justice, the
government of the resources of the country, or in any other matter in
relation to peace, order and good government and the general progress of
civilization?”23
As Jaja was later to discover, much to his chagrin, the colonial
protectorate was no more than an artifice for the total take-over of the
protected state by its protector with the connivance of the international
community as prescribed under the Act of Berlin of 1885. Indeed, the
colonial protectorates envisaged under the so-called protection treaties
have been rightly described as “the outcome of a para-legal
metamorphosis…[with] no place in international law as a juridically
justifiable institution.”24 they were actually a subterfuge for
the incorporation of the respective territories into the
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the situation existing both
before and after the Berlin Congress in 1884–5 facilitated the perpetration
of perhaps the greatest havoc in history by one group of people against
another. After over three centuries of enslavement of the African people,
the world was to witness another unprecedented travesty when an entire
continent was raped and pilloried by the same set of countries that had felt
no compunction in visiting misery and exploitation on our people. The odious
atrocity has left an indelible imprint on the consciousness and reality of
the African people so much so that hardly can any apologies or restitution
suffice or atone.
The Treaty of
Pursuant to the expansionist designs of the British in the Benin area, in
particular, and the Oil Rivers Protectorate, in general, it was felt that
Benin should be brought speedily within the ambit of the protectorate.25
Not only did the British frown at the overlordship of the Oba of Benin in
the hinterland in the Urhobo and Itsekiri areas, the sphere of influence of
the Oba, especially in relation to trade and other matters was sufficiently
irksome to the British that they decided that it was time for flag to follow
trade. The appointment of Henry Galway as Vice-Consul for the entire area in
1891 signaled the intention of the British to plant their feet firmly on
ground.
However, there was the small matter of how to disguise their intentions
before the powerful Oba Ovonranmwen of Benin who generally superintended the
trade in Benin and the adjoining areas in items such as palm oil, rubber,
gum copal, gum Arabic, incense gums and timber, much to the annoyance of the
British.26 As the British had done elsewhere, a carrot and stick
approach was felt desirable in the circumstance. While they were most
uncomfortable with the Oba’s predilection for what they considered fetish
practices, the British decided to postpone their rendezvous with “the City
of Blood”27 until much later, opting instead for negotiation with
a ruler between whom there was no love lost. Accordingly, it was in this
conjuncture that the 1892 Treaty was hatched. It should be pointed out
immediately that the feelings of distrust and mistrust were mutual and the
negotiations that led to the treaty smacked of a cat-and-mouse game.28
It is instructive that the British were determined to assuage the loss of
prestige they had suffered when previous visits of emissaries were shunned
by the Oba and his chiefs.29
Hence, this time around,
he would not be offering any presents unless and until a treaty had been
signed, unlike previously, when presents were given on arrival, a fact which
he believed had caused the failure of the mission.31 The emphasis
on the offering of presents by a visitor to his host became somewhat
trivialized when it was actually an African tradition merely symbolizing the
bona fides of a visitor before
his host rather than a bribe or “dash” which the British had transformed it
into.
After another two hours of waiting, the Oba finally appeared in full
regalia, accompanied by his chiefs and courtiers to receive the British
agent.
While all this was going on, the Oba kept consulting with his chiefs,
repeatedly inquiring whether Galway’s mission was for peace or war, more so
as the Oni of Ife was said to have sent him a warning in 1890 that the Ifa
oracle had foretold a great disaster in Benin35 while a man about
to be sacrificed during the ugie-ivie
ceremony in May, 1891 had also reportedly prophesied that white men
would come to ‘spoil Ado.’ 36
It needs be emphasized that
the Oba’s name (‘Ovurami’ instead
‘Ovonranmwen’) was written. 38
A Critical Analysis of the Treaty
As earlier indicated, the Treaty was the standard one used in consolidating
the British stranglehold on different parts of the Oil Rivers Protectorate
which the British had proclaimed on
The opening clause of the Treaty tells an obvious lie to the effect that it
was in compliance with the request of the Oba of Benin that the Queen of
England intended to “extend to him, and to the territory under his authority
and jurisdiction, her gracious favour and protection.” The British were
impelled to so pretend in order to mask the fact that the Treaty was a
colonial diktat. However, Art. 2
immediately exposes the true intent of the British to deprive the Oba of his
independence at the foreign plane by stipulating that the Oba “agrees and
promises to refrain from entering into any correspondence, Agreement, or
Treaty with any foreign nation or power, except with the knowledge and
sanction of Her Britannic Majesty’s Government,” a variant of the so-called
‘negative-sovereignty’ clause. 39
In other words, the Oba, to all intents and purposes, was to become a vassal
of Queen
As I had observed elsewhere, treaties such as the one in question could not
be likened to the capitulation treaties signed with the
More poignantly, all disputes between the Oba of Benin and other Kings and
Chiefs or between him and British or foreign traders or between the Oba and
other neighbouring ethnic groups, which could not be settled amicably
between the two parties, were to be submitted to “the British Consular or
other officers appointed by Her Britannic Majesty to exercise jurisdiction
in the Benin territories for arbitration and decision, or for arrangement.”
42
[48]
Art. V of the Treaty was, arguably, the most outrageous. Under it, the Oba
of Benin engaged “to assist the British Consular or other officers in the
execution of such duties as may be assigned to them; and, further, to act
upon their advice in matters relating to the administration of justice, the
development of the resources of the country, the interest of commerce, or in
any other matter in relation to peace, order, and good government, and the
general progress of civilization.”
Even the most liberal reading of this clause cannot disguise the complete
take-over of the sovereignty of the
As if the was not enough, the British compelled the Oba to open up his
territory to trade by all foreigners, with rights to own houses and
factories therein.44 Besides,
no hindrances were to be placed in the way of Christian missionaries while
all forms of religious worship and religious ordinances were to be exercised
throughout the domain of the Oba.45
In effect, it was ‘Open Sesame’ for
all alien adventurers to exploit the wealth and resources of the Benin
kingdom. And, as a final seal on the unequal arrangement, the Treaty
provided that in the event of any wreckage of any British vessel within his
domain, the Oba was obliged to render assistance to the crew and do
everything in his power to prevent plunder and deliver any salvaged goods to
the rightful owners of their agents while the resident British Consular
officer should exercise powers of arbitration for any claims for salvage.46
Interestingly, the Treaty merely provided that it shall come into operation
“so far as may be practicable, from the date of its signature.”47
While there was no provision for implementation
[49]
Lessons for Contemporary
Although
It should be recalled that soon after independence,
These are just some examples of
Admittedly, the international nuisance value of states depends on a number
of variables, including population, GDP, Human capital development, size of
armed forces, etc. Yet,
As far as treaty-making and treaty implementation go, there is a great need to
overhaul the bureaucracy servicing the activity. Situations that led to the
conclusion of the recent Green Tree Agreement, for instance, must be avoided.
The procedures for treaty-making and treaty implementation should be well
understood by all those involved in the exercise while input from the people by
way of public hearings concerning the most important engagements should be
actively encouraged.
It is self-evident that
Treaties are mere instruments for realizing foreign policy objectives.
Accordingly, the real task confronting
Perhaps the most significant lesson from the British-Benin debacle is that
weakness severely incapacitates an actor in international relations. The fact
that the British, within five years of entering into an engagement with the Oba
decided to overrun his domain, seize him and banish him far from his domain,
loot the priceless treasures of the palace, humiliate and oppress the population
should be a lesson for us all today not to take anything for granted. In the
dangerous and difficult world that we inhabit, it is a wise precept to hope for
the best while preparing for the worst.
Today, greedy eye of numerous foreign exploiters are riveted on our raw
material. We are all living witnesses to the invasion of countries by powers
that are primarily interested in the resources of their victims. We have heard
of neutron bombs that would kill people but leave farmsteads, factories and
other structures standing for the appropriation and enjoyment of the victors the
morning after. In order not to suffer the fate of our forefathers, we must
apprehend the validity of the admonition of Vegetius:
Qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum
(Whoever desires peace must prepare for war). Granted that
The 19th century was the period when we were colonized. The 20th
century was the time when we managed to recover our sovereignty from forces that
did not have any qualms in slicing out an entire continent like an apple-pie to
be shared among themselves. The 21st century should be the era when
we are able to consolidate on our nation-building efforts in order to ensure
that, never again, would we be subjected to the stranglehold of foreign powers
that are out to exploit and humiliate us.
[51]
1
See G-C. K. N. Onyeledo, “international
Law” Among the Yoruba-Benin and the Hausa-Fulani in AFRICAN
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL HISTORY 156 (A. K. Mensah-Brown, ed. 1975). See also
J. U. EGHAREVBA, A SHORT HISTORY OF BENIN 1 – 14 (1969). 2
A. B. Oyebode,
Treaty-Making and Treaty Implementation in 3
Ibid.
at p. 11. 4
K.
MARK, CAPITAL, Vol. 1, p. 751 (1967) 5
M. CROWDER, THE STORY
OF 6
S. O. Biobaku, An
Historical Account of the Evolution of 7
Ibid.
8
See O. IKIME, THE FALL OF 9
Cf. Akin Oyebode,
Treaties and the Colonial 10
O. ADEWOYE, THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN 11
Ibid. at 14. 12
J. F. MAITLAND-JONES, POLITICS IN EX-BRITISH 13
See, e.g., J. C. ANENE,
SOUTHERN NIGERIA IN TRANSITION, 1855 – 1906,
at 63 (1966).
[14]
See supra note 8, at 39. 15
Elias, International Relations in 16
Cf. Oyebode,
supra note 9, at 21-22. 17
For more on this, see supra
note 2, at pp. 21-29. 18
For an analysis of the origins and types of the capitulation treaties,
see C. H. Alexandrowicz, The
Afro-Asian World and the Law of Nations (Historical Aspects), 123
Hague Recueil Des Cours 150-157 (1962).
19See
Treaty with the Alafin of Oyo and Head of Yorubaland, 20
Cf. Oyebode,
supra note 9, at 20 21
U. O. UMOZURIKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 22
89 BRIT. STATE PAPERS 1089, quoted in C. H.
Alexandrowicz, The Role of
Treaties in the European-African Confrontation in the Nineteenth Century
in AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 55. 23
IKIME, supra note 8, at 38 –
39. 24
25
Cf. RYDER,
supra note 1, at 266. 26
Ibid. at 268. 27
Cf. R. H. BACON,
28
RYDER, op. cit. 268 -70. 29
Ibid. at 268. 30
Ibid. 32
Ibid.
33
Ibid. at 270. 34
Cf. RYDER,
op. cit. at 270. 35
See J. EGHAREVB, A SHORT HISTORY OF 36
RYDER, ibid. 37
Ibid. at 271.
[48]
Ibid.
39
Cf. Alexandrowicz,
supra note 24, at 64-65. See
also id., supra note 22, at
55. 40
Art. 41
See Oyebode, supra note 9, at
22. 42
Art. IV
[48]
Cf. RYDER,
op. cit. 272. 49
See his THE WEST
50
Cf. Oyebode,
Towards a New Policy on
Decolonization in
[51]
See Oyebode, External Imperatives
of Democracy in |
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